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tion and rescission is great, an award of damages may indeed be unduly
burdensome. Second, if a creditor fails to take the necessary steps to
effectuate the consumer's rescission, the consumer is allowed to keep the
property without obligation.68 In such a case an additional award of
damages may actually subject a creditor to two penalties; the caveat seeks
to avoid this result.
Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, stated in Palmer v.
Wilson: " [He] would limit the court's equitable discretion [to refuse a
monetary award] to cases where a civil penalty would be an inequitable
windfall to an overreaching [consumer] ."69 T h e two previous examples
would fall within this category.
Allowing courts this discretionary power will have little effect upon
the Act. The creditor is deterred in any event. He must disclose according to the Act's requirements, for a court would surely award penalties
regardless of any resulting harshness if he deliberately fails to disclose.
The ever-present threat of both sanctions insures creditor adherence to
the Act; without this threat rescission might not be sufficient to enforce
disclosure compliance.70

Criminal Procedure - PAROLEREVOCATION
HEARINGS
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- Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,
5 18 P.2d 721 (1974).

THE

Daryl Standlee, a Washington State parolee,' was charged with abduction, assault, attempted rape, and molesting a minor. Proceedings to
suspend his parole began following the charges but were stayed pending
a criminal trial. Even though Standlee was acquitted at trial on an alibi
defense, the prison authorities, considering the same evidence, ruled he
had violated his parole and revoked it. The only factual issue in either
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Standlee sought a writ of
habeas corpus, contending that collateral estoppel2 prevented the reliti6815 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970). This result was reached in Sosa v . Fite, 498 F . 2d 114 (5th Cir.
1974), where 2 years after siding was installed on a consumer's residence the consumer was
allowed to rescind the transaction because disclosure of credit terms had not been made. Because of the creditor's failure to effectuate rescission the consumer was allowed to keep the
siding without obligation. In addition, it should be noted that the consumer was awarded
attorney's fees even though the rescission section of the Act does not provide for them.
69502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Judge Wright, concurring in part and dissenting i n
part). Judge Wright dissented from the majority conclusion that a court could condition
rescission on repayment by a debtor. He stated the right to rescind was unconditional.
'Osee Boyd at 182-83;Griffith at 16-17;Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 207.
'Standlee's prior conviction was for rape. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at
iv, Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,518 P.2d 721 (1974).
2

Res Judicata necessitates an identity of causes of action, while the invocation of collateral
estoppel does not. . . . Where there is a second action between the parties, or their privies,
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gation of issues in a parole revocation hearing previously adjudicated in
a criminal trial. The court of appeals denied the writ and the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the revocation of Standlee's parole. It reasoned that the standard of proof in a parole revocation
hearing is less than that required in a criminal trial, thus denying the
application of collateral estoppel to prevent the relitigation of issues in
the revocation hearing.3

It is generally held by state and federal courts that the standard of
proof in parole revocation hearings is less than that required in a criminal
trial.4 State courts generally require that the hearing officer be reasonably satisfied that the parole has been violated;5 and while a definitive
standard for federal boards has not been set by the Supreme Court, it appears such boards are also required to find violations based on satisfactory
evidence.6 Appellate courts reviewing parole board rulings only examine the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the parole
authority has been capricious or arbitrary in revoking the parole.7
Evidentiary standards for revocation hearings, however, may shortly
come under greater scrutiny in view of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions broadening due process requirements for parolees. In
Morrzssey v . Brewer8 the Court required that a parolee be afforded a preliminary hearing in order to meet the requirements of due process when
who are bound by a judgment rendered in a prior suit, but the second action involves a
different claim, cause, or demand, the judgment in the first suit operates as a collateral
estoppel as to, but only as to, those matters or points which were in issue or contraverted
and upon the determination of w h i l the initial judgment necessarily depended.
PRACTICE
7 0.441 [2], at 3777 (2d ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
1B J. MOORE,FEDERAL
3Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974).
4See United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 241-42, 244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); cases cited note 5 infra; see also
ANNOT.,
29 A.L.R. 1074 (1953).
5See, e.g., People v. Whittaker, 101 Ill. App. 2d 432,243 N.E.2d 467 (1968) (preponderance);
People v. Kuduk, 320 Ill. App. 610, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1943) (reasonable doubt is not required);
State v. Whilhite, 492 S.W.2d 397,399 (Mo.App. 1973) (reasonable satisfaction).
Wnited States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225,
241-42, 244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Note, Parole Revocation in the
Federal System, 56 GEO. L.J. 705, 717 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Parole Revocation in the
Federal System); 6 SUFF.UNIV.L. &v. 1206 (1972); see also Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4
(1971); 28 C.F.R. 235 (1974) (satisfactory evidence is necessary to issue an arrest warrant on a
parolee).
'Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,222 (1932); Caton v. Smith, 486 F.2d 733, 735 (7th Cir.
1973); I n re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 84, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 830, 357 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Sup. Ct.
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 10 (1961); Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 260,453 P.2d 35, 42
(1969); Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42
U. COL.L. REV. 197,210 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Cohen).
8408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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depriving him of his valuable conditional l i b e r t ~and
, ~ in Gagnon v .
Scarpellilo the Court added the right to counsel under certain circumstances.ll In the earlier decision of In re WinshiP,12 the Court specifically held that the reasonable doubt standard of proof for criminal prosecutions is a due process requirement, and that due process mandates this
same standard for juvenile hearings. l3 The Court in Morrissey and
Gagnon did not consider what standard of proof due process requires for
parole revocation hearings, leaving the question of whether the principles of Winship apply to parolees as well as juveniles. A second issue,
related to the applicable standard of proof, is whether the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment allows the result reached in Standlee.
The trend14 has been to increase the protections for parolees. This note
will discuss whether this trend includes the reasonable doubt standard of
proof and the application of double jeopardy principles for parole revocation hearings.

Standlee contended that collateral estoppel should have prevented the
parole board from relitigating issues of fact which had been previously
resolved in his favor in a criminal prosecution. While the Washington
State Supreme Court agreed that the collateral estoppel doctrine is a
necessary incident of the fifth amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy, it agreed with other jurisdictions holding that a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution.l5 It reasoned that parole
revocation is not punishment for conduct violative of the terms and conditions of the parole, but simply a continuation of punishment for an
original conviction. These distinctions, according to the court., support
the position that a different standard of proof is permitted in the revocation hearing from that required at a criminal trial. The result is that
collateral estoppel does not prevent the relitigation of issues in the sub-

91d. at 484.

1°411 U.S. 778 (1973).
llZd. at 790. The Court said counsel should be provided when the parolee denies the alleged parole violations or where there are mitigating circumstances for parole violation which
would either be difficult to present at the hearing or make revocation inappropriate.
12397U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
'3Id. at 368.
l4For a comprehensive review of the history of parole revocation hearings in the state and
federal jurisdictions see Cohen, supra note 7; Parole Revocation in the Federal System, supra
note 6 ; Note, Parole Revocation Procedures, 65 HARV. L. REV.309 (1951) (hereinafter cited as
Parole Revocation Procedures), Comment, Reuocation of Conditional Liberty - California
and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1955); Comment, The Parole System, 120 U .
PA. L. REV.282, 342-58 (1971) (hereinafter cited as The Parole System).
'583 Wash. 2d at 407,518 P.2d at 722, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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sequent parole hearing.16 As authority for denying the application of
collateral estoppel, the court relied on two federal tax decisions disallowing application of the doctrine in behalf of taxpayers in civil suits which
were subsequent to criminal prosecutions in which they were found not
quilty under a different standard of proof.l7
T h e court acknowledged that revocation hearings are subject to some
due process requirements, but that those requirements did not prohibit
its holding. '8
Justice Utter argued in dissent that due process required the reasonable doubt standard of proof for parole revocation hearings. He also
argued that collateral estoppel should, therefore, apply and-prohibit the
reli tigat ion of issues resolved at trial. lg

A. Due Process and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof
Essential to the majority holding is the proposition that due process
does not require the reasonable doubt standard of proof for parole revocation hearings because such hearings are not criminal proceedings. The
majority of state and federal decisions support this position20 and are
summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey: " [TI he
revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution and thus the
full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply
to parole revocation^."^^ However, the trend away from the traditional
viewZ2 of the purposes and characterizations of parole revocation hearings was also suggested in the Morrissey opinion:
1683 Wash. 2d 405,40748,518 P.2d 721,722-23.
l71d. citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) and Neaderland v. Commissioner,
424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1970).
'883 Wash. 2d at 409, 518 P.2d at 723. Here the court was referring to language in Morrissey
v . Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480. The court did not consider whether the principles outlined in
Morrissey affected the standard of proof to be applied at parole revocation hearings.
1983Wash. 2d at 410,518 P.2d at 724.
20See cases and authorities cited in notes 3-7 supra.
Z1408 U.S. at 480.
22Cohen, supra note 7, at 206-13; The Parole System, supra note 6, at 284-89. The following
theories have been used to deny due process protections for parolees in revocation hearing:
Right - Privilege Distinction. The principal case is Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935),
where the Court said that parole is a privilege and a matter of grace rather than a right. Its
reasoning is that due process only protects against invasion of rights held under the Constitution and not mere privileges. This distinction is no longer dispositive and was buried for the
purposes of parole revocation hearings by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482 (1972).
Constructive Custody. By this approach, courts have denied procedural due process because
the parolee was held to have been serving his sentence in an expanded prison wall. Since the
parolee is thought to remain within the custody of the prison, he has no freedom for due
process to protect. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah
407,408, 160 P.2d 721,722 (1945).
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[TIhe liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the
core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous
loss" on the parolee and often on others. . . . By whatever name, the
liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.23

This passage indicates the social and legal interests supporting the extension of due process safeguards to a parolee. O n one hand the government
has an interest in returning to prison a parolee who has violated the conditions of his parole. Underlying this interest are many of the same considerations which motivate the government to imprison a person for a
crime, such as the public safety and welfare, protection of property,
respect for law, and rehabilitation.24 On the other hand is the parolee's
interest in his conditional liberty and the due process guarantees involved when one is deprived of liberty.25
It is clear that the state has an interest in exercising more control over
parolees than it exercises over the general citizenry, but it is not clear that
a standard of proof for revocation hearings lower than the reasonable
doubt standard better serves the interests of the public. Just as with a
criminal, the sovereign has an interest in assuring the fair treatment of a
parolee, especially when he denies the allegations that he violated his
parole. T h e Supreme Court has indicated special concern for a revocation hearing involving a parolee who denies he has violated his parole.
In Gagnon the Court held that due process requires that counsel be provided when a parolee denies the acts which are the basis for the revocaContract Theory. Under this theory it is held that when a parole is granted, the parolee
contracts with the sovereign and agrees to act within the terms and conditions of his parole.
Failure to meet those terms results in the loss of all the rights he held under the contract, and
it is held that due process does not prevent this forfeiture. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
Civil
Criminal Distinction. Many courts do not allow due process protections for a
parolee as a result of the holding that a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal proceeding.
Standlee is an example of this reasoning.
Parens Patriae. This phrase is to explain the identity of interest a parole board is supposed
to have with the parolee in his rehabilitation. It is argued that one need not be protected from
another who has an identity of interest and that procedural safeguards are not necessary.
Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,407 (2d Cir. 1970).
Statutory. It has been held that the rights of a parolee are statutory only and are therefore
not protected by the Constitution. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
Exhausted Rights Theory. Since the parolee was given full constitutional protection at his
original trial, it is not necessary to further protect him and his parole can be revoked at anytime. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 442, 146 P.
1009, l o l l (1915).
231d. at 482; see Cohen, supra note 7 at 201.
24Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 483; see generally The Parole System, supra note 14, at
347.
25The Parole System at 346; for cases representing the view that the parolee's loss of freedom outweighs an increased state burden in affording due process guarantees in parole revocation hearings see cases cited in Cohen, supra note 7, at 209 11-78.

-
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tion of his parole.26 The Morrissey decision also indicated the Court's
concern for procedural safeguards when a parolee's conduct is in issue.
T h e court asserted no fewer than three times that the first stage of the
parole revocation hearing is to be a determination of whether the parolee
had "in fact" violated his par0le.~7By requiring that counsel be provided
when acts of violation are denied and in unequivocally using the phrase
i n fact when speaking of parole revocation, the Court is emphasizing the
importance of protecting the parolee at this stage of the hearing. Although the standard of proof in a parole revocation hearing has not been
considered since Morrissey and Gugnon, the expanding due process requirements recognized in those two cases may be sufficient to encompass
the reasonable doubt standard of proof.
the United States Supreme
In the similar area of juvenile hearing~,~g
Court has specifically held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
require the reasonable doubt standard of proof to prove alleged criminal
acts.29 A review of the history of juvenile hearing decisions of the Supreme Court shows that due process requirements for juvenile hearings
were expanded in much the same way as they are now being expanded
for revocation hearings.30 By its decision in I n re Guult,3l the Court provided accused juveniles the due process protections of notice of charges,
the right to counsel, the right to be confronted by and examine witnesses,
Following Gault, the
and the privilege against self-in~rimination.3~
Court in In re Winship specified the standard of proof required by due
process for juvenile hearings, stating:
[TIhe constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as
much required during the adjudicating stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in G a d t . . . .33

In G a d t the Court decided that all the due process requirements of a
criminal trial are not necessary for juvenile hearings, but did require "the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."s4 By requiring the reason26411U.S. at 790.
27408U.S. at 479,483-84, 487-88.
28Cohen,supra note 7, at 212:
[I] n an area closely analogous to parole revocation proceedings in both philosophy and
procedure, juvenile delinquency proceedings, the United States Supreme Court rejected
most of [the theories similar to the traditional views of parole] which had theretofore
been accepted as reasons for denying traditional due process safeguards to juveniles.
29172 re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
3OFor a history of juvenile court cases and the evolution of due process for juveniles see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967) and Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60
Nw. U.L. REV.585 (1965).
31387 U.S. 1 (1965).
32Id. at 31-58; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
33397 U.S. at 368.
34387 U.S. at 30; 397 U.S. at 359.
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able doubt standard of proof in Winship the Court has placed this standard of proof in the category of "the essentials of due process and fair
treatment. "35
Morrissey and Gagnon exhibit the same procedural concerns with
respect to parole revocation hearings as Gault represents for juvenile
hearings. These concerns are manifest because it is recognized that liberty is being taken and must be done so constitutionally.36 Because
parole revocation hearings, just as juvenile hearings, may result in imprisonment, the Morrissey and Gagnon decisions suggest that due process should also require the reasonable doubt standard of proof in parole
revocation hearings.
The traditional theories of parole and parole revocation37 have
avoided due process requirements for parolees.38 For example, courts
have reasoned that a parolee is not being returned to prison for the violation of his parole, but only to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed for his original crime.39 T h e Morrissey decision undermines these
theories by stating that a parolee possesses "core values of unqualified
liberty," the loss of which would be griev0us.4~Regardless of the theory
a parole board uses for reincarcerating a parolee, the fact remains that
liberty is taken from the parolee. T h e same standard should apply for
parolees as is used in criminal and juvenile cases without regard to the
degree or nature of the liberty being taken.
It has been further suggested that there are questions a hearing officer
must decide which are not consistent with the use of the higher standard
of proof, such as whether the parolee is likely to commit another criminal
act if granted continued parole and whether he has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation to warrant relea~e.4~
The reasoning is that these
questions are judgmental, discretionary, and not susceptible of specific
proot making it impractical to hold the decision makers to a strict standard of proof.42 However, these discretionary questions arise in the second stage of the parole revocation hearing and are improper if the
parolee did not violate the terms and conditions of his parole. Chief
Justice Burger outlined the stages of a revocation hearing in Morrissey,
stating:
35The Court defined the issue in Winship as "whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
among the 'essentialsof due process and fair treatment' . . . ." 397 U.S. at 359.
36See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
37See note 22 supra.
38Cohen, supra note 7, at 206.
39Zd. at 21 1 ; see also note 14 supra.
40408 U.S. at 482.
4lTobriner and Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"? Parolees and Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 801,810 (1974).
42Zd.
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The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of
one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the
parolee did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should
the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?43

Of the severability of these two stages, the Chief Justice further said:
A simple factual hearing will not interfere with the exercise of discretion. . . .
This discretionary aspect of the revocation decision need not be
reached unless there is first an appropriate determination that the individual has in fact breached the conditions of parole. The parolee is not
.the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake
in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful life
within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked
because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation
of the need to revoke parole, given the breach of parole c0nditions.~4

Under this two-step procedure, the use of the reasonable doubt standard
of proof will not interfere with the discretionary aspects of the board's
decision.45 If revocation is based on denied allegations of parole violation, then those allegations should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
or the discretionary stage of the hearing should not be reached.
Parole is a universal feature of the modern penal system and some
jurisdictions have provisions for automatic par0le.~6 It has been estimated that 35 to 45 percent of all parolees have their paroles revoked and
are returned to prison.47 This high frequency of revocation indicates
the increased possibility that a parolee may be reimprisoned who is actually innocent of any parole violations. This is the same fundamental
concern that has led to the use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof
in criminal prosecutions.
T h e higher standard of proof in parole revocation hearings will have
the further advantage of requiring judges and hearing officers to be more
careful in passing judgment on the evidence, leaving fewer opportunities
for capricious or arbitrary acti0n.~8Further, the parolee should perceive
43408 U.S. at 479-80.
441d. at 183-84.
45Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger implies, one standard of proof will not burden the discretion of a parole board any more than any other standard of proof.
46408 U.S. at 477; e.g., 18 U.S.C. $ 4163 (1971).
47408 U.S. at 479. According to a 1973 report, 60 percent of all felons released in 1968 from
prisons in state and federal jurisdictions are released on parole. In some states this percentage
goes as high as 95. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION
ON LAWENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATIOX
OF
JUSTICE,
TASK
FORCEREPORT:GIRRECTIOXS
391 (1973). If the 35 to 45 percent revocation rate
is the same today as it was in 1968, it means that 21 to 27 percent of all felons sent to prison
violate their subsequent parole.
48Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; see also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-20 for a discussion of how
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that he is more fairly treated as a result of the increased procedural concern for a strict determination of the truth, and this should aid in his
rehabilitati~n.~g
If the reasonable doubt standard of proof were adopted for the factual
determination stage of the hearing, the standard of review on appeal
could focus on the sufficiency of the evidence, instead of the present
limited inquiry into the use of discretionary power. This closer examination of the evidence by appellate courts would be another incentive for
hearing officers to increase the care with which they pass upon the evidence.50 Use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof in revocation
hearings would also provide collateral estoppel protection against the
relitigation of issues already determined at trial, preventing incongruous
results like the decision reached in Standlee.

B. Collateral Estoppel and Acquitted Parolees
Even if the higher standard of proof is not adopted, the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause should be held to prohibit the result
reached in Standlee, regardless of the due process issues. The Supreme
Court has applied the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to
the states through the fourteenth amendment,51 and included, as a part of
double jeopardy, the doctrine of collateral est0ppel.5~As authority for
denying the application of collateral estoppel, the Washington Supreme
Court relied on Helvering v. Mitchel153 and Neaderland v. Commissioner.54 The court cited these two cases for the proposition that if there
is a different standard of proof in a subsequent civil case, the previous
criminal acquittal is not a bar to the relitigation of issues in the civil
action.55 In fact, this is the present majority rule as it applies to a criminal trial and a subsequent parole revocation hearing56
the supposed good intentions in a hearing that lacks procedural due process protections can
result in high-handed treatment of the juvenile.
Wohen, supra note 7, at 214-15; Parole Revocation Procedures, supra note 14, at 309 & n.6.
50The added burden on the parole board resulting from the shift to the reasonable doubt
standard of proof would be no greater than that which has resulted from changing the standard in juvenile hearings. Of that change the Supreme Court has said it would not "compel
the states to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Winship, 397 U.S. at 367.
51Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
s2Ashev. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
53303 U.S. 391 (1938).
54424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1970).
5583 Wash. 2d at 407-08,518 P.2d at 722-23.
56Powell v. Wainright, 403 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 912 (1969);
MacLaren v. Denno, 173 F. Supp. 237, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afgd, 272 F.2d 19, cert. denied,
363 U.S. 814 (1960); Valdez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974); contra, In re
Hall, 63 Cal. 2d 115, 117,45 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135,403 P.2d 389, 391 (1965).
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In both Mitchell and Neaderland, the taxpayers were acquitted of
criminal charges which carried possible punishments of fine and imprisonment. A subsequent civil action was brought by the government
for payment of the taxes, and in both cases the defense of collateral estoppel was raised. In setting aside the defense, the Supreme Court reasoned in Mitchell that the first proceeding was punitive and that the subsequent suit was remedial, in which case double jeopardy did not apply.57
T h e Court also pointed out that one of the issues in the criminal prosecution not litigated in the civil action was whether there was a willful evasion of the income tax.58 Thus there was not only a different standard of
proof in the two proceedings, but also different issues and different poThe Mitchell Court further asserted in dictum that
tential san~tions.~g
if the two proceedings are both criminal or if the aim of both proceedings
is to punish the defendant, the relitigation of issues in the second proceeding is prohibited by the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause.60
There are four questions derived from Mitchell to consider in determining whether collateral estoppel should prevent a subsequent litigation: (1) Are the standards of proof in the two proceedings the same? (2)
Are the issues identical in the two proceedings? (3) Are the proceedings
both criminal? and (4) Are the possible sanctions both punitive? An
affirmative answer to question (2) is necessary for the principles of collateral estoppel to apply by definition.61 Since an affirmative answer to
either question (3) or (4) will suffice for collateral estoppel to bar the subsequent proceeding,G2 question (1) need not be answered affirmatively.
In Standlee, even though the standards of proof for the criminal trial
and the revocation hearing were different, the only factual issue in each
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Thus Standlee is distinguishable from Mitchell and Neaderland in that the latter two cases
did not relitigate identical issues in the subsequent civil action.
In attempting to obtain an affirmative answer to question (3) parolees
must show that a revocation hearing is a criminal proceeding for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. This is difficult because courts have not
s7303 U.S. at 404-05.
58Id. at 397-99.
59Zd. at 397. The court in Neaderland did not examine the sanctions, but did indicate that
the nature of the two proceedings, the standard of proof, and the issues were different as between the trial and the civil action. 424 F.2d at 64143. The holding of the court in hTeaderland was that the issue of willfully evading the payment of income tax in a criminal trial is different from the issue of fraud in a civil action. Id. at 642. The Court in Mitchell only inferred
that the two issues may be different. 303 U.S. at 398. The only issue presented at the trial and
the revocation hearing in Standlee was the identity of the assailant.
60303 U.S. at 398-99; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S.
232,235-37 ( 1 972).
61SeeNote 1 supra.
62Seenote 60 supra and accompanying text.
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precisely defined what type of proceeding a revocation hearing is.63 An
argument finding some support is that a revocation hearing is enough
like a criminal proceeding4 to be in the same category as a criminal trial
for certain purposes. However, as indicated above, courts have declined
to characterize a revocation hearing as a criminal proceeding for the purposes of due process,65 but this is not necessarily true under double jeopardy requirements. Double jeopardy guarantees focus more on the possibility of two criminal sanctions for one crime. Since a revocation hearing may ultimately result in imprisonment, it is more like a criminal trial
than a civil proceeding. The Supreme Court, in the context of a forfeiture action, has held that a proceeding may be civil in form but criminal in nature, and that this criminal nature is sufficient to require the
imposition of double jeopardy guarantees when the forfeiture action
follows a criminal trial.66 Certainly this same reasoning applies to the
forfeiture of liberty involved in a revocation hearing.
In connection with question (4) above, the strongest argument under
the Mitchell inquiry for the application of collateral estoppel for parolees
in cases like Standlee is that the ultimate sanctions of a criminal trial and
a revocation hearing are both punitive. It is obvious that the sanctions
are the same in degree if not in purpose. Even though it is widely held
that a parolee is reincarcerated and punished only for the original crime
when found guilty of parole violations,67 it does not comport with
reality68 to say that he is not being punished for his parole violations. His
punishment for his parole violation is the loss of his conditional freedom,
and this cannot be considered a remedial sanction. Consequently, there
is not the distinction in Standlee between a trial with a punitive sanction
and a civil action with a remedial sanction as in the tax cases, for both
proceedings in Standlee carried punitive sanctions.
It appears, therefore, that the Mitchell rationale would require application of double jeopardy guarantees in Stand lee, even though different
standards of proof may be upheld with respect to a trial and a revocation
hearing. The criminal nature of the revocation proceeding and the punitive nature of its sanction seem to require the operation of double jeopardy principles to prohibit the relitigation of identical issues in the revo63Courts usually only go so far as to state that a revocation hearing is not a criminal proceeding and point to differences between a trial and the revocation hearing as the court did in
Standlee.
64United States v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723,726 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
The court said, "a parole revocation proceeding, subjecting the parolee to imprisonment, is
assuredly a 'criminal proceeding.' " It limited this, however, to 26 U.S.C. 8 5848 (1971).
65408 U.S. at 480.
66United States v. United States Coin and Currency,~401U.S. 715, 718 (1970); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616,634 (1886).
67See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 55 111. App. 2d 157,204 N.E.2d 314,3 16 (1965).
68The Parole System, supra note 14, at 293-95.
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cation hearings. The recent Illinois Supreme Court case of People v .
Grayson69 directly supports this position. Grayson had been indicted for
armed robbery while on probation, but at the criminal trial the judge
found that there was insufficient evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A petition to revoke Grayson's probation was granted based
on the same armed robbery. The court reversed the revocation, holding
that collateral estoppel applied and was a bar to the relitigation of issues
already determined at trial. The court said that the differences between
a criminal trial and revocation hearing were not sufficient to prevent
collateral estoppel protections, specifically stating that the different
standards of proof "could not fairly serve to permit relitigation of the
identical issue upon the same e~idence."~OGrayson appears to better
represent the requirements set forth in Mitchell and Neaderland as to
when collateral estoppel should apply than does Standlee.
A popular phrase reflects the conviction that "a man should not have
to run the gantlet twice for the same charge."T1 In reality the petitioner
in Standlee was subjected to the risk of imprisonment for the same
charges in two different proceedings. Of a situation involving two trials
the Supreme Court said:
"No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first
charge, and, when he lost, he did what every good attorney would do he refined his presentation [in the second trial] in light of the turn of
events in the first trial." But this is precisely what the constitutional
guarantee forbids.72

T h e same reasoning should apply to parolees who have been acquitted at
criminal proceedings and then are required to again "run the gantlet" at
revocation hearings.73

IV. CONCLUSION
It is likely that the Supreme Court will need to clarify which standard
of proof is required to uphold the principles set down in Morrissey and
-

69People v. Grayson, 319 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1974); accord., In re Hall, 63 Cal. 2d 115,
117,63 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135,403 P.2d 389,391 (1965).
'O319 N.E.2d at 45.
'lwinship, 397 U.S. at 446.
721d.at 447, quoting the brief for the state.
'3A completely different situation arises where a parole board revokes the parole, and subsequently a criminal trial is instituted to prosecute the suspect for the same crimes which were
the basis for his parole revocation. When the parole board revokes parole, it does so on the
jurisdiction it maintains over the parolee because of his previous crime. The board is justified
in finding a violation of parole based on a trial conviction or mere parole violations. On the
other hand, the trial court gets jurisdiction because of the commission of the new crimes, and a
parolee's right to a jury trial of the new crimes with all other constitutional protections provided at a trial prevents a reliance on the factual determinations made at the revocation hearing.
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Gagnon. This is a fertile area for parolees anxious to test their status
under the expanding requirements of due process and the newly developing double jeopardy doctrine. Also, a precise definition of the standard
of proof to be used in federal parole revocation hearings is needed. A
radical modification of the standard of proof in revocation hearings will
likely be difficult to achieve. Even though there are constitutional arguments favoring the change, the due process principles are sufficiently
elusive to support either position.'
In assessing the potential success of challenges to the law enunciated in
Standlee, it is likely that an argument based upon the double jeopardy
doctrine will be the stronger approach. First, there is already support for
.~~
the fifth amendment
the position, as indicated by G r ~ y s o n Second,
does not draw distinctions among the many types of proceedings, nor is
the double jeopardy clause restricted to criminal trials. A single sovereign should not be able to circumvent a constitutionally guaranteed freedom by drawing meaningless distinctions between two closely related
proceedings. Finally, the constitutional protection afforded by the
double jeopardy doctrine in cases such as Standlee appeals to notions of
fairness and justice, which may prove to be the single most important
consideration when the question ultimately reaches the Supreme Court.
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TIONS

On May 24, 1971, the New York Legislature enacted the Transportation Capital Facilities Bond Act of 1971 which authorized the State
Comptroller to issue bonds in the amount of $2.5 billion upon approval
by the voters in the 1971 general election.' A nonprofit corporation,
Yes for Transportation in New York State, Inc. (YES), was organized on
August 24, 1971, to campaign for voter approval of the Act. YES received
individual and corporate contributions, including $50,000 from the New
York Telephone Company (NYT), a wholly owned subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).
By letter dated January 26, 1972, the executive director of the Project
on Corporate Responsibility (Project), a nonprofit corporation owning
one share of AT&T stock, notified the Chairman of the Board of A T & T
and the President of NYT of the Project's belief that NYT's $50,000
contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election Law
74319N.E.2d 43.

'N.Y. CONST.art. VII, 5 1 1 disallows any legislative enactment which increases the public
debt unless approved by a majority of the voters in a general election. The Capital Facilities
Bond Act of 197 1 was not so approved in New York's 197 1 general election.

